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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Story of Li Xiao-Jiang 
In Atlanta, Georgia, neuroscientist Li Xiao-Jiang was at the peak of his pro-
fessional career when his employment with Emory University was unexpectedly 
terminated in the summer of 2019.1 Before Xiao-Jiang’s employment was termi-
nated, he worked with his wife and lab co-leader at Emory University for twenty-
three years, conducting research related to Huntington disease.2 Xiao-Jiang, a 
tenured professor known nationally for his research and leadership within his lab, 
worked alongside committed postdoctoral students engaged in creating pig and 
mouse models to study Huntington disease.3 In May 2019, however, Xiao-
Jiang’s career came to a sudden halt when the school notified him of his termi-
nation of employment.4 According to Xiao-Jiang’s fellow researchers, university 
officials seized Xiao-Jiang’s lab and confiscated computer files and documents 
while Xiao-Jiang was on leave in China.5 Xiao-Jiang was stunned. In a statement 
following his termination, Xiao-Jiang exclaimed, he “was shocked that Emory 
University would terminate a tenured professor in such an unusual and abrupt 
fashion and close [their] combined lab consisting of a number of graduates and 
postdoctoral trainees without giving [him] specific details for the reasons behind 
[his] termination.”6 Emory claims it followed the direction given by the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) in a statement aimed at combating the “unacceptable 
breaches of trust and confidentiality that undermine the integrity of U.S. biomed-
ical research.”7 
Emory University justified its actions by claiming it found evidence that Xiao-
Jiang failed to make necessary disclosures related to his ties to China.8 Emory’s 
 
 1 Jon Cohen, Terminated Emory Researcher Disputes University’s Allegations About 
China Ties, SCIENCEMAG (May 24, 2019, 1: 55 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019 
/05/terminated-emory-researcher-disputes-university-s-allegations. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Zhenhua Lu, Emory University in U.S. Fires Scientists Over Undisclosed Funding Ties 
to China, S. CHINA MORNING POST (May 24, 2019, 8:00 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news 
/china/diplomacy/article/3011732/us-emory-university-fires-scientists-over-undisclosed-
funding. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Cohen, supra note 1. 
 7 Cohen, supra note 1. See also Jon Cohen, Terminated Emory Researcher Disputes Uni-
versity’s Allegations About China Ties, ScienceMag (May 24, 2019, 1: 55 PM), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/05/terminated-emory-researcher-disputes-university 
-s-allegations; Francis S. Collins, Statement on Protecting the Integrity of U.S. Biomedical 
Research, 2018 NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH. 
 8 Ariel Hart, New Findings: Two Emory Researches Didn’t Disclose Chinese Funding, 
Ties, ATLANTA J. CONST. (May 24, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—
politics/two-emory-researchers-failed-disclose-chinese-funding-and-ties/QQ58XiznS11TLY 
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statement regarding the termination of Xiao-Jiang’s employment defended its 
actions, stating: 
[t]hrough an internal investigation prompted by a letter that the 
NIH sent to many academic research universities, Emory discov-
ered that two of its faculty members named as key personnel on 
NIH grant awards to Emory University had failed to fully disclose 
foreign sources of research funding and the extent of their work 
for research institutions and universities in China.9  
Xiao-Jiang participated in the Thousand Talents Programme, a controversial 
program backed by the Chinese government that intends to attract acclaimed ex-
perts to work in China.10 
Xiao-Jiang says he worries for his lab workers directed to leave the United 
States (one of which was pregnant at the time of Xiao-Jiang’s sudden termina-
tion), and he also fears for the future of the hundreds of mice that were indispen-
sable to his Huntington disease research.11 The story of Xiao-Jiang, while cer-
tainly not the norm, reflects an increasingly common narrative of Chinese 
researchers across the United States.12 Xiao-Jiang’s story illustrates the narrative 
of academic espionage: the practice of stealing information related to research, 
national intelligence, or security under the guise of academic activity.13 College 
campuses have increasingly become primary targets for espionage. Researchers 
and government leaders are becoming more creative in their pursuits to steal in-
formation in the academic environment. As the threat of academic espionage 
rises, universities and U.S. lawmakers will continue to propose policies and leg-
islation aimed at protecting the universities’ intellectual property interests and 
national security.14 Despite these efforts, foreign operatives will continue to seek 
new ways to obtain information and surpass the United States in areas of tech-
nology and science. 
 
v5rARfjL/. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Lu, supra note 4. 
 11 Cohen, supra note 1. 
 12 Ben Wolfgang, ‘Academic Espionage’: China Suspected of Flooding U.S. with Students 
to Access Sensitive Programs, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.c 
om/news/2019/aug/22/china-academic-espionage-deploys-students-us-acces/. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Ted Mitchell, Memorandum by ACE on Foreign and Academic Espionage, AM. 
COUNCIL ON EDUC. (May 10, 2019), https://www.nacua.org/docs/default-source/new-cases-
and-developments/2019/acemembershipmemo_foreignespionagemay2019.pdf. 
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B. Academic Espionage: An Overview 
Academic espionage poses a growing security threat that pervades research 
communities throughout the state of Georgia and the United States as a whole.15 
China and other foreign countries exploit university campuses across the United 
States by soliciting intelligence and information related to technological ad-
vancements under the guise of academic research.16 The practice impacts U.S. 
relations with China as the U.S. government continues to navigate through a 
trade war created in large part by U.S. actions and spending behaviors.17 Chinese 
efforts to accelerate in the fields of manufacturing, science, and research have 
thwarted the U.S. desire to remain the dominant global power in the realm of 
technology and trade.18 Further, Chinese and U.S. desires to dominate emerging 
technologies in the international arena increase the complexity of this issue. 
The United States passed legislation related to academic espionage, and newer 
proposals were discussed by members of Congress as recently as 2019.19 While 
passing legislation has the power to combat the threat of academic espionage, 
current and proposed laws fail to attack the problem in a comprehensive man-
ner.20 International law on espionage is complex, and scholars remain divided on 
how best to regulate spying, if regulations on spying should exist at all.21  
This Note will first provide a background of the issue of academic espionage 
and describe efforts—current and proposed—by U.S. lawmakers. The back-
ground section will provide an overview of the threat of academic espionage 
while noting specific instances and schemes used by individuals involved in the 
practice. The background section will also provide a brief foundation of the cur-
rent state of the relationship between the United States and China, the current 
 
 15 Elizabeth Redden, Scientist Fired From Emory Disputes Charges, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(May 28, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/05/28/scientist-fired-em 
ory-disputes-charges. 
 16 See Karin Fischer, Defense Bill Focuses on Academic Espionage, CHRON. OF HIGHER 
EDUC. (July 17, 2019), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Defense-Bill-Focuses-on/246713 
(discussing a bill and provision that works towards this goal). 
 17 Weijian Shan, The Unwinnable Trade War, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov./Dec. 2019), https:// 
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2019-10-08/unwinnable-trade-war. 
 18 Elsa B. Kania, Made in China 2025, Explained, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 1, 2019), https://thedipl 
omat.com/2019/02/made-in-china-2025-explained/. 
 19 Elizabeth Redden, Bills Target Academic Espionage, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 19, 
2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/06/19/two-new-bills-take-different-app 
roach-protecting-us-research-foreign-threats. 
 20 Andrew Hamilton, The State Department Wants to Limit Chinese Student Visas. Its 
Plan Goes Too Far, WASH. POST (June 22, 2018, 7:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/opinions/the-state-department-wants-to-limit-chinese-student-visas-its-plan-goes-too-far/20 
18/06/22/c66f4238-74aa-11e8-805c-4b67019fcfe4_story.html. 
 21 See A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 595 (2007) (discussing the legality of espionage and difficulties with gaining 
a consensus on categorizing or regulating the practice). 
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trade war between the two countries, and how current discussions and negotia-
tions may impact the desires of both countries to advance in technology and sci-
ence. 
Next, the Note will highlight the flaws within U.S. legislation related to aca-
demic espionage. Here, the Note will explain why international law and regula-
tions must be implemented by the U.S. government to effectively combat the 
threat of espionage to U.S. institutions. This analysis will include viewing the 
issue of academic espionage through the lens of international trade law. Finally, 
this Note will conclude by advocating that states should create and enforce inter-




Foreign operatives, located primarily in China, have increased efforts to steal 
information related to technology, research, and national security through aca-
demic exchanges.22 This practice, otherwise known as “academic espionage,” 
continues to threaten U.S. academia.23 The threat of academic espionage looms 
larger each day, and U.S. researchers and lawmakers have yet to determine an 
appropriate response to this unique threat.24 
A. Techniques Used: Confucius Institutes and the Thousand Talents Plan 
Foreign operatives have found new techniques to steal information through 
academic activities—like the Confucius Institutes or the Thousand Talents 
Plan—even though specific information sought through these activities remains 
relatively unclear.25 In an attempt to establish global dominance in technology 
and research, Beijing uses United States universities as virtual breeding grounds 
for spying and espionage.26 According to the U.S. Defense Department, “nearly 
 
 22 Wolfgang, supra note 12. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Patricia Zengerle & Matt Spetalnick, Fearing Espionage, U.S. Weighs Tighter Rules on 
Chinese Students, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2018, 7:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-china-students-exclusive/exclusive-fearing-espionage-us-weighs-tighter-rules-on-chines 
e-students-idUSKCN1NY1HE. 
 25 Zachary Cohen & Alex Marquardt, U.S. Intelligence Warns China is Using Student 
Spies to Steal Secrets, CNN POL. (Feb. 1, 2019, 9:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/ 
politics/us-intelligence-chinese-student-espionage/index.html. 
 26 Ana Swanson & Keith Bradsher, White House Considers Restricting Chinese Research-
ers Over Espionage Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04 
/30/us/politics/trump-china-researchers-espionage.html?module=inline. 
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a quarter of all foreign efforts to obtain sensitive or classified information in 2014 
were routed through academic institutions.”27 
The installation of Confucius Institutes on university campuses nationwide 
exemplifies how foreign researchers presumably steal information from U.S. re-
searchers.28 Confucius Institutes function as schools funded by the Chinese gov-
ernment and are placed on college campuses in the United States.29 Most Confu-
cius Institutes teach classes in Mandarin, provide cultural education, and seek 
community involvement, though the purpose of the school varies from campus 
to campus.30 The first Confucius Institute was implemented on a college campus 
in 2004, and at its peak, more than ninety Confucius Institutes existed in the 
United States.31  
Although campuses are allowing more Confucius Institutes to set up through-
out the United States, foreign intelligence experts warn of the dangers and risks 
associated with the programs.32 The concerns over Confucius Institutes inter-
twine with larger considerations regarding Chinese efforts to surpass U.S. strides 
in technology and security.33 Christopher Wray, Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI), addressed intelligence concerns related to Chinese infor-
mation-gathering efforts in a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in February 
2018.34 Addressing the academic response to foreign espionage threats, Wray 
exclaimed, “[a]nd I think the level of naïveté on the part of the academic sector 
about this creates its own issues. [Chinese researchers are] exploiting the very 
open research and development environment that we have, which we all revere, 
but they’re taking advantage of it.”35 
Other public figures, like politicians, warn of the dangers of academic espio-
nage. Marco Rubio, a Republican Senator from Florida, especially fears threats 
posed by Confucius Institutes and Chinese espionage in general.36 During the 
 
 27 Id. 
 28 Ted Mitchell, Letter on Confucius Institutes, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC. (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Letter-on-Confucius-Institutes.pdf. 
 29 Elizabeth Redden, Closing Confucius Institutes, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 9, 2019), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government 
-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Amy Gunia, A Senate Report Has Slammed the Chinese Learning Centers Operating 
at Over 100 U.S. Universities, TIME (Feb. 28, 2019, 1:53 AM), https://time.com/5540703/senat 
e-report-confucius-institute-us-universities-chinese/. 
 33 Mitchell, supra note 14, at 1. 
 34 Global Threats and National Security: Hearing Before the S. Intelligence Comm., 115th 
Cong. (2018) (statement of Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Elizabeth Redden, The Chinese Student Threat?, INSIDER HIGHER ED (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/02/15/fbi-director-testifies-chinese-students-and 
-intelligence-threats. 
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same hearing in which Wray spoke, Rubio commented that he believes Confu-
cius Institutes are “complicit in these efforts to covertly influence public opinion 
and to teach half-truths designed to present Chinese history, government or offi-
cial policy in the most favorable light.”37 Senator Rubio joined with Senator 
Cruz, another senator who is vocal about combatting the threats posed by aca-
demic espionage, to explore legislation that uses a hardline approach against var-
ious research activities conducted in China.38 According to a statement made by 
Senator Cruz, “[t]he Confucius Institutes are the velvet glove around the iron fist 
of their campaigns on our campuses. The American government needs new tools 
to protect the integrity of our universities and research, and to block academic 
espionage.”39 The legislation passed by Cruz followed the public warnings re-
lated to academic espionage given by FBI director Christopher Wray.40 
Confucius Institutes, while one example of academic espionage, exist among 
other mediums through which Chinese operatives and researchers seek to steal 
U.S. information through academic engagement.41 U.S. lawmakers fear China’s 
“Thousand Talents Plan,” one of the Chinese Communist Party’s many recruit-
ment programs aimed at obtaining U.S. “scientific and technological expertise,” 
will subject the United States to security threats and intellectual property theft.42 
Although the Thousand Talents Plan is the most known recruitment program 
conducted by the Chinese Communist Party, it is one of over two hundred re-
cruitment programs intended “[t]o gain technology from abroad through illegal 
or non-transparent means.”43 The Thousand Talents Plan gives applicants op-
tions for participating, such as a “short-term” option which allows participants 
“[t]o spend only two months in China each year.”44 The recruitment programs 
conducted by the Chinese government has reportedly recruited “60,000 overseas 
scientists and entrepreneurs between 2008 and 2016.”45 The United States intel-
ligence community warns that the efforts of the Thousand Talents Plan emanate 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Josh Rogin, Preventing Chinese Espionage at America’s Universities, WASH. POST 
(May 22, 2018, 2:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/05/22/ 
preventing-chinese-espionage-at-americas-universities/. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Aruna Viswanatha & Kate O’Keeffe, Chinese Official Charged in Alleged Visa Scheme 
to Recruit U.S. Science Talent, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2019, 9:47 AM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/chinese-official-charged-in-alleged-visa-scheme-to-recruit-u-s-science-talent-
11569332862. 
 42 Kate O’Keeffe & Aruna Viswanatha, How China Targets Scientists via Global Network 
of Recruiting Stations, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/h 
ow-china-targets-scientists-via-global-network-of-recruiting-stations-11597915803. 
 43 Alex Joske, Hunting the Phoenix, AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE (Aug. 20, 
2020), https://www.aspi.org.au/report/hunting-phoenix. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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from a desire to steal intellectual property and information related to U.S. ad-
vancements in technology and research.46 
The U.S. government has investigated several researchers as a result of con-
nections with the Thousand Talents Program.47 Yiheng Percival Zhang, a profes-
sor at Virginia Tech, was found guilty of conspiracy to commit fraud after filing 
to receive grants for research he already completed in China.48 Zhang’s behavior 
was suspected of being connected to China’s Thousand Talents Plan.49 In ad-
dressing China’s Thousand Talents Plan, FBI Director Wray stated: 
[t]he irony is that the U.S. is essentially funding that economic 
resurgence through various money it provides through grants, 
etc. . . . . I think we need to be a little bit careful that we don’t 
find ourselves in a situation where U.S. taxpayer money is being 
misappropriated for the advancement of China’s economic dom-
inance over us.50 
Confucius Institutes, China’s Thousand Talents Plan, and other espionage ef-
forts—formalized and informalized alike—cause American lawmakers to target 
individual researchers and, in particular, researchers from China.51 As a result of 
mounting fears related to academic espionage, the U.S. State Department pro-
posed limiting visas for Chinese students.52 Within the past year and a half, the 
U.S. government has revoked visas from at least thirty Chinese professors con-
ducting research in the United States.53 One example occurred in Atlanta, Geor-
gia, where the FBI interviewed a social sciences researcher who attended an 
event at the Carter Center. The U.S. government subsequently cancelled his 
visa.54 Much of the U.S. government’s approach links to FBI Director Wray’s 
 
 46 Jeff Mordock, Feds Step Up Probe on China’s “Thousand Talents Plan” After Convic-
tions, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/aug/25/ 
china-thousand-talents-plan-funnels-us-intellectua/. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Virginia Tech Professor Yiheng Percival Zhang Convicted of Swindling U.S. Grants for 
Research He’d Already Done in China, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 27, 2019, 1:29 AM), https:// 
www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/2187817/virginia-tech-professor-yi 
heng-percival-zhang. 
 49 Mordock, supra note 46. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Hamilton, supra note 20. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Jane Perlez, F.B.I. Bars Some China Scholars From Visiting U.S. Over Spying Fears, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/world/asia/china-academi 
cs-fbi-visa-bans.html. 
 54 Id. (The case of Wu Baiyi, mentioned here, is evidence of the suspicion that the United 
States government is particularly focused on interrogating the actions of researchers involved 
with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. One researcher involved with the Chinese 
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reasoning that academic espionage threatens the “whole of society” and therefore 
warrants a “whole of society response.”55 The “whole of society response” men-
tality fuels American lawmakers to assess this threat from a variety of angles, 
including higher education, international relations, and technological competi-
tion.56 
Although academic espionage gives rise to valid fears, battling these complex 
fears leads to unfair prosecutions and firings of scholars. Several stories of stu-
dents are rich with allegations but fail to assert concrete evidence.57 In deciding 
how to best address academic espionage in specific cases, colleges and govern-
ment officials should first ask if academic espionage is occurring at all. Senseless 
firings and investigations have increased stigmas against Chinese professors and 
hindered the process toward developing meaningful solutions.58 
B. United States Relations with China 
To fully understand the efforts made by China to gather intel into U.S. ad-
vancements in science and technology and, on the other hand, to understand U.S. 
legislation proposed to combat the threat of academic espionage, one must ana-
lyze the current state of the relationship between China and the United States. 
Since 1979, when President Jimmy Carter recognized China as a nation-state for 
the first time, the United States has had a storied trade relationship with the coun-
try.59 In 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the U.S.-China Relations Act of 
2000, which led to China becoming the United States’ second-biggest trade part-
ner by 2006.60 In 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the 
United States would “pivot” to Asia to increase investment in the Asia-Pacific 
 
Academy of Social Sciences, in addressing United States action directed towards individuals 
at the academy, believed “[t]hey may feel we know too much about the United States.”). 
 55 Hearings, supra note 34 (statement of FBI Director Wray). 
 56 Perlez, supra note 53. 
 57 See Ben Wolfgang, ‘Academic Espionage’: China Suspected of Flooding U.S. with Stu-
dents to Access Sensitive Programs, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonti 
mes.com/news/2019/aug/22/china-academic-espionage-deploys-students-us-acces/. 
 58 See Matt Apuzzo, Former Espionage Suspect Sues, Accusing F.B.I. of Falsifying Evi-
dence, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/us/politics/fbi-xi-
xiaoxing.html (discussing the case of a professor who was wrongly accused of academic es-
pionage); see also Emily Feng, FBI Urges Universities to Monitor Some Chinese Students and 
Scholars in the U.S., NPR (June 28, 2019, 10:36 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/28/72865 
9124/fbi-urges-universities-to-monitor-some-chinese-students-and-scholars-in-the-u-s (ex-
plaining that universities are wary of the U.S. government’s approach “because of skepticism 
of the threat level and because the FBI requests lack specificity in implementation”). 
 59 U.S. Relations with China, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-
relations-china (last visited Aug. 28, 2020). 
 60 Id. 
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region.61 In 2011 and 2012, trade-based tensions between the United States and 
China rose as the United States trade deficit grew to a record-breaking $295.5 
billion.62 
During his administration, President Obama stated that “[t]he relationship be-
tween the United States and China is the most important bilateral relationship of 
the 21st century.”63 Obama made evident his efforts to establish trade policy 
aimed at protecting the United States while engaging the country in globalized 
trade by forging the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).64 At the time, the TPP 
stood as the world’s most significant trade deal, including commitments and ac-
tivities comprising forty percent of the world’s economy.65 In keeping with his 
administration’s “pivot” towards Asia, the TPP was Obama’s solution to grow-
ing trade tensions between the United States and China and his administration’s 
international strategy to advance economically while incorporating the partici-
pation of other countries.66 The TPP was considered a “hallmark achievement” 
for President Obama.67 However, despite Obama’s enthusiasm in creating and 
implementing the TPP, the plan quickly divided policymakers.68 When many 
members of Congress in President Obama’s own party viewed the TPP with 
skepticism, President Obama continued to advocate for the vital partnership he 
positioned as foundational to his foreign policy agenda.69 In May 2015, President 
Obama traveled to Nike World Headquarters to give a speech on the importance 
of TPP membership.70 “If we don’t write the rules for trade around the world, 
 
 61 Kenneth Lieberthal, The American Pivot to Asia, BROOKINGS (Dec. 21, 2011), 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/. 
 62 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., supra note 59. 
 63 Cheng Li, Assessing U.S.-China Relations Under the Obama Administration, 
BROOKINGS (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/assessing-u-s-china-relatio 
ns-under-the-obama-administration/. See also David E. Sanger & Edward Wong, As Obama 
Plays China Card on Trade, Chinese Pursue Their Own Deals, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/us/politics/as-obama-plays-china-card-on-trade-chines 
e-pursue-their-own-deals.html (stating that the U.S. and China’s competitive relationship is 
seen by “many in the Obama administration . . . as the most important geopolitical power 
struggle in the world today.”). 
 64 Kevin Granville, What Is TPP? Behind the Trade Deal That Died, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-what-is-trans-pacif 
ic-partnership.html. 
 65 James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacifi 
c-partnership-tpp. 
 66 Granville, supra note 64. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See id. (discussing opposition to the TPP by many Democratic organizations, including 
unions, environmental, and consumer groups). 
 69 Siri Srinivas, Trans Pacific Partnership: Obama Ready to Defy Democrats to Push Se-
cretive Trade Deal, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2015, 11:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com 
/business/2015/jan/20/barack-obama-trans-pacific-partnership-republicans. 
 70 Sanger & Wong, supra note 63. 
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guess what?” President Obama asked the crowd during his speech aimed at gar-
nering support for American manufacturers, “China will.”71 The United States 
joined the TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership in February 2016.72 
Until the election of Donald Trump, the TPP continued to create divisions 
along party lines.73 During the first week of Donald Trump’s presidency, he with-
drew the United States from the TPP.74 Despite President Trump’s hinting at 
rejoining the TPP, the partnership has proven to be one of many complexities 
defining the trade relationship between the United States and China.75 
Under the Trump administration, the United States became entrenched in a 
trade war with China.76 In July 2018, President Trump imposed tariffs on Chi-
nese goods worth $34 billion.77 Threats and actions taken by President Trump 
against China are not only rooted in what he claims to be unfair trade policy, but 
the tariffs are also a result of what the United States government views as Chi-
nese threats to steal national intellectual property.78 
In addition to imposing aggressive tariffs against China, the Trump admin-
istration first considered proposals to prohibit Chinese researchers from engag-
ing in academic activity on U.S. university campuses.79 Efforts to combat the 
threat of academic espionage undoubtedly relate to safety and protecting the re-
search conducted by U.S. faculty. However, the United States’ insatiable desire 
to maintain power and dominance stands as the driving force behind efforts to 
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block and prohibit Chinese efforts to spy and steal U.S. intellectual property.80 
In addition to the current practice of revoking visas for Chinese researchers, the 
White House initially considered implementing restrictions on certain projects 
performed by Chinese researchers.81 Proposed projects to be restricted included 
activities related to China’s potential scheme to dominate in the technological 
arenas of “advanced microchips, artificial intelligence[,] and electric cars.”82 
C. United States Law: Past and Present Measures Taken to Combat 
Academic Espionage 
The United States has grappled with how to best address the threat of academic 
espionage by passing various laws aimed at combatting the unique threat. Pro-
posed legislation that would focus on academic espionage comes in various 
forms. Many communities, particularly those in the higher education profession, 
conclude that current proposals aimed at curbing academic espionage unfairly 
prejudice and hinder the open and collaborative academic environments that the 
United States prides itself in creating.83 Others claim that the aggressive, unified 
actions taken by U.S. lawmakers are beneficial and necessary to protecting na-
tional security.84 The challenge of finding appropriate measures to address the 
threat of academic espionage will increase as the threat continues to grow and 
garner attention within the United States. The challenge of finding a solution by 
using United States law alone will perhaps be insurmountable. 
The discussions on academic espionage occurring in the halls of congressional 
office buildings depend on how members of Congress define the threat in the 
first place. Many government officials believe Chinese researchers “are 
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responsible for a great deal of intellectual-property theft.”85 Members of the 
Trump administration fear new initiatives made by Chinese corporations to fi-
nance research conducted at universities in the United States, an activity the De-
partment of Justice labeled a “roadmap to [intellectual-property] theft.”86 How-
ever, beyond stating broad concerns related to protecting intellectual property, 
government officials have rarely described their concerns with specificity. One 
university administrator, after receiving warnings from FBI Director Christopher 
Wray concerning academic espionage, complained: 
What exactly Mr. Wray has in mind, where precisely he sees the 
threat—this is all left frustratingly vague. Some of the guidance 
has been, “[b]e careful about anything to do with biotech.” Well 
biotech is huge; I don’t even know which faculty to talk to if you 
don’t tell me more.87  
As lawmakers continue to try to pass legislation aimed at curbing academic 
espionage, members of Congress must answer their opponents who demand an 
explanation for what they perceive to be nebulous fears. 
Within the past year, Congress implemented two measures in hopes of effec-
tively targeting academic espionage.88  Proposed on June 18, 2019, the Protect 
Our Universities Act, if passed, would require Chinese, Iranian, and Russian stu-
dents to participate in background checks before engaging in certain research 
projects.89 The Protect Our Universities Act is sponsored by Senator Josh Haw-
ley, who claims:  
For too long, these countries have sent students to our universities 
to collect sensitive research that they can later use to develop ca-
pabilities that threaten our national security . . . [t]his bill takes 
much-needed steps to ensure our research stays out of the hands 
of foreign adversaries who are proactively rooting for our fail-
ure.90  
The U.S. government introduced the Protect Our Universities Act just one 
month after Emory University fired Dr. Li Xiao-Jiang without notice after alleg-
edly failing to disclose relationships and funding with China. 91 Many individuals 
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within the academic community oppose the bill and believe the approach could 
lead to profiling and stereotyping.92  
One alternative approach to the Protect Our Universities Act is the Securing 
American Science and Technology Act (SASTA).93 The SASTA, if enacted, 
would mandate the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) and the 
United States National Security Advisor to “establish an interagency working 
group to coordinate activities to protect federally funded research and develop-
ment from foreign interference, cyberattacks, theft, or espionage.”94 The SASTA 
takes a softer approach in combating the threat of academic espionage, as it 
strives to maintain the open and collegial environment of the American academic 
community.95 Representative Mikie Sherril, a New Jersey Democrat and sponsor 
of the bill, stated, “We have to get this right. We must protect our innovation and 
research while maintaining the international engagement and demonstrated value 
foreign students bring to our institutions of higher learning.”96 The contrasting 
approaches taken by the Protect Our University Act and the SASTA demonstrate 
the disagreements within both higher education and national security communi-
ties. Neither approach will combat the threat of espionage in its entirety, and as 
Congress continues to brainstorm ways to protect academic communities from 
foreign spies, the threat continues to mount.97  
Many academics and U.S. citizens alike favor the softer approach in combat-
ting the deleterious effects of academic espionage.98 According to the BBC, over 
360,000 Chinese students received an education in the United States during the 
2017–2018 academic year.99 However, many scholars believe applications from 
international students are decreasing because of the recruitment programs’ dis-
criminatory effects, similar to laws passed with the goal of combatting academic 
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espionage.100 American Council on Education Senior Vice President Terry 
Hartle expressed concern over declining international college applications as a 
result of state action against espionage.101 “Campus officials are worried that in-
ternational students could become pawns in a trade war,” Hartle commented.102 
Former Citizenship and Immigration Services Director Leon Rodriguez testified 
in front of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee and gave a direct response to the 
warnings given by FBI Director Christopher Wray.103 Rodriguez gave a warning 
of his own: “The warnings given by Director Wray about possible use of the 
Confucius Institutes as vehicles for non-traditional intelligence gathering and 
other activities which may undermine open academic discourse deserve to be 
taken very seriously and appropriate government action taken in response.”104  
Fears over academic espionage are fueling congressional conversations re-
lated to allocations and funding. In July of 2019, the House of Representatives 
passed a $733 billion defense bill containing language aimed at combatting the 
effects of academic espionage.105 Along with the SASTA, the defense bill in-
cludes a provision that increases funding for the National Security Education 
Program’s Chinese language classes, as well as programming to train partici-
pants to recognize and report individuals suspected of spying.106 The defense bill 
passed in the House of Representatives and awaits passage in the Senate.107 The 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is significant legislation that Con-
gress passes each year, and partisan tensions increased complications and adjust-
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III. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Categorizing Academic Espionage Within International Law 
Academic espionage is regulated at the margins of international law. Interna-
tional regulation of academic espionage is difficult to conceptualize and enforce, 
and academic espionage is itself difficult to categorize.109  Interstate relationships 
and agreements create the legality of academic espionage, and shifting admin-
istrations alter levels of discussion on the topic.110 Academic espionage is best 
compartmentalized under international trade law because the services and bene-
fits created by educational institutions affect the economic, transnational rela-
tionships between the United States, China, and other countries.111 Aspects of 
international immigration law apply to academic espionage as well. Questions 
related to visas, global exchanges, and human relations all supplement the dis-
cussion regarding solving international academic espionage.112 
United States law faces the arduous task of sorting out the disparities in inter-
national law on the regulation of academic espionage. The legislative actions 
taken by the United States are in many ways harmful and inadequate in regulat-
ing academic espionage and monitoring its effects.113 To the extent that United 
States law lacks comprehensive regulation for academic espionage, creating a 
framework to regulate academic espionage through international trade law is a 
noble and necessary endeavor. 
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B. General Espionage in International Law 
Academic espionage is a new phenomenon, and campuses across the United 
States face puzzling challenges in combatting the emerging threat.114 Espionage, 
on the other hand, has existed in nations across the globe for centuries.115 Espio-
nage is often unregulated within the realm of international law.116 The practice 
of international espionage “consists of the access, on behalf of a state, to infor-
mation that is held by another state and considered as confidential or strategic, 
in the military, security, or economic field.”117 Today, many international leaders 
and theorists struggle to determine how far to go in regulating espionage, while 
many others believe that regulation should not exist at all.118 
The legality of espionage is viewed differently in contexts of war than in the 
contexts of peace in subsets of the international community.119 Espionage during 
times of war is often permissible in the view of most countries, and many coun-
tries appreciate the opportunity to gain information through spying in times of 
war.120 International law does not expressly encourage wartime espionage, how-
ever, at the very least, captured spies receive certain protections during times of 
war.121 The 1907 Hague Regulations state: “A spy taken in the act shall not be 
punished without previous trial.”122 Further, the absence of explicit international 
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regulation on espionage supports the theory adopted by many state actors that 
espionage is not illegal.123 This principle laid the foundation of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice’s decision in France v. Turkey, or, The Lotus Case, 
which held that states have discretion in participating in certain behavior as long 
as the state conduct does not violate explicit law or prohibitions.124 
Despite international law’s obscurity on the topic, countless nations behave as 
though espionage is legal.125 The United States justifies spying as a necessary 
practice in furthering safety for its citizens.126 In 2006, Director of National In-
telligence John Negroponte reported that the United States had approximately 
100,000 spies conducting espionage-related activities around the globe.127 The 
U.S. government has become increasingly aware of spy-related activities di-
rected against the nation, but tracking down spies and combatting their efforts is 
a difficult task to perform.128 Advancements in communications and technology 
have only facilitated the art of espionage.129 
In conclusion, international law regarding general espionage is, in large part, 
unsettled.130 However, individual interstate agreements and international princi-
ples inform the legal analysis of spying.131 While many state actors view inter-
national espionage as invasive and contrary to ideals of individual state 
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sovereignty, many others believe the practice should exist as an unregulated ac-
tivity.132 
C. Academic Espionage Under International Trade Law 
Academic espionage is best regulated under international trade law. The ser-
vices and exchanges created in the realm of higher education position academic 
espionage as a practice that affects trade relations.133 Academic research is vast 
and ever-expanding, and the international aspect of research is implicated and 
expressed in many areas of international trade. 
D. International Trade Law: A Brief Overview 
International trade encompasses customs, rules, and agreements formed be-
tween countries intending to govern trade interactions.134 Numerous trade agree-
ments govern the international interplay of exports, goods, and information tech-
nology. A trade agreement is “[a]n agreement—such as the North American Free 
Trade Agreement—between two or more countries concerning the buying and 
selling of each country’s goods.”135 A multilateral trade agreement most often 
includes more than two regional countries, and is defined as “[a] treaty that reg-
ulates international commerce, such as TRIPs, GATT, or GATS.”136 The United 
States is a member to several multilateral trade agreements, including the World 
Trade Organization137 and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).138 
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The United States focuses much of its administrative and government involve-
ment with international trade on trade remedy actions and export control work.139 
Trade remedy actions regulate and monitor unfair pricing actions, distortions of 
a healthy flow of goods internationally, and unfair government subsidies that 
may hinder United States business endeavors internationally.140 An example of 
a trade remedy action is a regulation aimed at dumping.141 An antidumping law 
is “a statute designed to protect domestic companies by preventing the sale of 
foreign goods at less than fair value, as defined in the statute (for example, at a 
price below that of the domestic market).”142 The United States International 
Trade Commission also outlines antidumping laws.143 The International Trade 
Commission is “an independent, nonpartisan, quasi-judicial federal agency that 
fulfills a range of trade-related mandates.”144 The International Trade Commis-
sion, along with other government agencies, demonstrate the significance of 
United States law related to controlling fairness and protecting the national mar-
ket.145 
United States export law is expansive. Export laws govern not only the ship-
ment of fungible goods but also the distribution of surreptitious technology and 
information.146 The Bureau of Industry and Security, a division of the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, promulgated ten categories of information and goods to 
describe types of exports.147 The Commerce Control List (CCL) denotes the fol-
lowing relevant categories as exports subject to particular regulation: electronics, 
computers, telecommunications, and information security.148 The CCL acts 
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among other regulations, collectively known as the Export Administration Reg-
ulations, as an extensive regulatory mechanism enforced by the Bureau of Indus-
try and Security.149 
The discussions and relationships expressed through bilateral trade agree-
ments illuminate international trade law.150 The United States maintains free 
trade agreements with twenty different countries.151 Their interest in joining free 
trade agreements increased under President George W. Bush’s administration, 
and executive support for such agreements emerged after the enactment of the 
Trade Promotion Authority in 2002.152 President Obama demonstrated his will-
ingness to join the United States in free trade agreements with the creation of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership.153 
Policymakers and citizens alike voiced varying views on the effectiveness and 
necessity of free trade agreements. In 2014, the Congressional Research Service 
categorized these views on free trade agreements into three groups.154 The first 
group opposed free trade agreements and viewed them as “stumbling block[s]” 
to achieving liberalized global trade.155 The second group supported free trade 
agreements and viewed them as “building block[s]” to producing liberalized 
multilateral trade.156 The third group disliked international trade agreements gen-
erally, stating that free trade agreements undermined the sovereignty of the U.S. 
economy and negatively impacted works in import-sensitive sectors.157 President 
Trump took a different approach than both President Bush and President Obama 
did on free trade agreements.158 Nonetheless, free trade agreements will continue 
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to operate as one of the many moving factors within the international trade frame-
work.159 
The United States currently addresses international trade by participating as a 
member to several international agreements and consulting various forums for 
information related to trade regulation.160 Most importantly, however, the United 
States is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).161 The WTO serves 
as “the principal forum for setting the rules of international trade. In its two and 
a half decades, it has helped reduce barriers to trade of both goods and services 
and created a dispute resolution system that supporters say reduced the threat of 
trade wars.”162 The WTO built upon the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).163 As the foremost administrative body that creates the legislation, pol-
icy, and rules for international trade, members of the WTO should prioritize the 
regulation of academic espionage by engaging the members of the international 
body. United States involvement with the WTO has been tense, and President 
Trump’s desire to out-maneuver China in the trade war led to many controversial 
conversations.164 In July of 2019, President Trump tweeted, “[t]he WTO is 
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BROKEN when the world’s RICHEST countries claim to be developing coun-
tries to avoid WTO rules and get special treatment. NO more!!! Today I directed 
the U.S. Trade Representative to take action so that countries stop CHEATING 
the system at the expense of the USA!”165 The future of United States involve-
ment in the WTO may continue to be complex, and predicting the future United 
States involvement in any type of international trade agreement will be diffi-
cult.166 
E. Academic Espionage as Trade in Services: GATS, TRIPS, and the New 
WTO 
The nature of trade has globalized and advanced significantly throughout his-
tory. For most of history, the focus of international trade has been on tangible 
goods instead of intangible products and services.167 However, in the 1980s, the 
international community developed an increased desire to liberalize trade in ser-
vices.168 This interest in viewing trade with a more expansive mindset led to the 
creation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a centerpiece 
of the WTO Uruguay Round in 1995.169 The GATS, along with the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), created a new 
framework for international trade.170 Instead of viewing trade through the lens of 
goods alone, the new WTO framework categorizes trade into three distinct cate-
gories: goods, services, and intellectual property.171 
To understand trade in services, one must assess the four modes of supply 
created by GATS, a framework created to categorize different types of ser-
vices.172 The first mode, cross-border, consists of “services supplied from the 
territory of one Member into the territory of another.”173 Consumption abroad 
includes “services supplied in the territory of one Member to the consumers of 
another.”174 Commercial pressure, the third mode of supply created by GATS, 
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involves “services supplied through any type of business or professional estab-
lishment of one Member in the territory of another.”175 Finally, the fourth mode, 
presence of natural persons, regards “services supplied by nationals of one 
Member in the territory of another.”176 
Academic espionage falls into the fourth mode of presence of natural persons 
established by GATS. The presence of natural persons “could involve persons 
who are themselves service suppliers, and present on a temporary basis in foreign 
markets for the supply of their services, such as foreign consultants or the em-
ployees of foreign services suppliers sent abroad to fulfil a service contract.”177 
The work product of faculty and researchers involves services of many types. 
From research conducted in labs—like the work done by neuroscientist Li Xiao-
Jiang—to developments in technology and advancements made in medicine, the 
services produced by researchers within academia are numerous.178 
Academic espionage is most accurately categorized as trade in services; there-
fore, the practice should be governed by GATS law through the WTO. However, 
as academic espionage continues to evolve as an emerging threat in U.S. aca-
demia, and as members of Congress continue to highlight intellectual property 
concerns related to the phenomenon, the practice of academic espionage should 
be regulated through law on intellectual property rights. In addition to GATS, 
the WTO 1994 Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) was created to address the intellectual property nature of global-
ized trade.179 The TRIPS Agreement addresses trademarks, copyright issues, pa-
tents, and other issues related to intellectual property rights.180 The TRIPS agree-
ment specifically created a framework for dealing with intellectual property and 
designated a dispute resolution system within the WTO.181 
F. Applying International Trade Law to Academic Espionage 
State actors should regulate academic espionage using international trade law. 
Institutions of higher learning produce sensitive data, participate in global re-
search projects, engage students from around the world, and operate in conjunc-
tion with government officials and intelligence officers.182 The services produced 
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by colleges and universities bring the work product of institutions of higher 
learning within the broad definition of trade created by international law.183  
A need for clear regulation of academic espionage exists on college campuses 
and within Congress. The livelihoods of researchers and the protection of U.S. 
universities depend on it. With little guidance given by Congress or the executive 
branch, university administrators and researchers have difficulty approaching the 
perplexing issue of academic espionage.184 The current state of the law is the 
reason behind sudden firings of researchers like Li Xiao-Jiang on campuses like 
Emory University in Atlanta.185 Current legislative proposals either stymie uni-
versity efforts to create diverse campuses, or prove to be underinclusive in com-
batting the complexities posed by academic espionage.186 International trade law 
would provide clarity and useful enforcement mechanisms to bolster efforts to 
keep campuses safe. 
Academic espionage can only be regulated at the fringes of international trade 
law, for no unified doctrine, treaty, or agreement exists to readily monitor the 
threat. To effectively regulate academic espionage, Congress must assess the 
many angles of the threat and survey relevant international agreements and laws. 
First, it is worth noting that college campuses produce many of the products and 
activities deemed as exports by the Commerce Control List. The Commerce Con-
trol List (CCL) denotes the following relevant categories as constituting an ex-
port subject to particular regulation: electronics, computers, telecommunications, 
and information security.187 The United States higher education community 
stands at the forefront of the production, creation, and design of materials related 
to electronics and computers.188 Further, and perhaps most importantly, college 
campuses are also encompassed by telecommunications activities and pursuits 
entrenched in information security. American institutions function as gateways 
to information on national security, and the products and services created by 
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United States institutions allow the activities to be pulled under export law.189 
Exports are no longer limited to tangible goods, food, and products for mass pro-
duction.190 Today, abstract activities and even information are viewed as ex-
ports.191 Viewing academic espionage through the lens of an export will allow 
the United States to narrow the definition of the activity and further regulate the 
practice. 
In addition to viewing the practice of academic espionage through the lens of 
export law, relying on the treaties, international agreements, and partnerships the 
United States is already member to will bolster efforts to combat threats posed 
by academic espionage. Despite President Trump’s recent disdain towards the 
WTO and its rules related to China (or perhaps because of them), the WTO 
should prioritize finding effective solutions to issues raised by academic espio-
nage through its membership and unique position to create rules on international 
trade.192 The WTO emphasizes the regulation of various goods, continues to 
drive significant conversations on agriculture, regulates services, prioritizes is-
sues related to intellectual property, and more. If the WTO approached the issue 
of academic espionage, it would not only assist the member countries interested 
in sovereignty and security, but it would further the purpose of the organiza-
tion.193 Since the 1940s, the WTO has negotiated agreements and policies related 
to trade barriers.194 The United States and the WTO alike should value free shar-
ing of information, furthering the marketplace of ideas, and promoting free trade 
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across international borders. Were the United States to spearhead an international 
effort to combat threats posed by academic espionage through the effective me-
dium of the WTO, trade would flourish in academic communities in a manner 
unrestricted by spying. The trade and services produced by United States insti-
tutions must be regulated and protected, and the free flow of information and 
goods will occur more effectively with international monitoring of espionage in 
academic settings. 
Of course, international regulation of academic espionage will need to draw 
strength upon individual, state-to-state relationships. The state of relations be-
tween the United States and China is ever-changing, and new developments in 
the U.S.-China trade war arise virtually every week.195 As stated earlier, the prac-
tice of espionage is least restricted, and almost encouraged, during times of 
war.196 Although the current trade war does not include weapons and soldiers, 
convincing the United States and China to completely eliminate actions related 
to academic espionage will inevitably prove to be an arduous task. However, the 
challenge does not mean the two countries should not try. Academic pursuits 
encompass the livelihood of researchers and the activities and dreams of stu-
dents. Universities often serve as the bedrock of the communities in which they 
reside, and the discoveries and work produced by colleges impact the lives of 
virtually every citizen around the globe. Protecting the freedom and environ-
ments of open institutions is a noble effort that should be prioritized over ambi-
tions to out-maneuver other countries in the pursuit of economic dominance. 
G. Why United States Law is Underinclusive and Ineffective in Solving Issues 
Raised by Academic Espionage 
Current United States law is inadequate to solve the issues created by the prac-
tice of academic espionage. Bills discussed on the House floor today are either 
unduly aggressive, stymying open and collaborative campuses, or lacking in en-
forcement mechanisms to eradicate the threats posed by academic espionage in 
a comprehensive manner.197 Neither a defensive domestic approach that re-
sponds to new threats daily nor an offensive approach that offends American 
values of free and open learning environments will best address the complex 
challenges raised by academic espionage. Further, international regulation can 
serve as a beneficial source of information and medium of enforcement on 
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matters of international trade and other contexts where transnational interactions 
abound. 
The Supreme Court of the United States stated,  
[i]nternational law is part of American law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice . . . . For this pur-
pose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or 
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the cus-
toms and usages of civilized nations.198  
Academic espionage is intrinsically international in nature. To the extent that 
United States law will inevitably miss certain risks posed by academic espionage 
in efforts to curb threats posed by the practice, international law is capable of 
filling in the gaps. Current United States legislation only focuses on internal prac-
tices.199 Producing an international framework to address international espionage 
is not only beneficial, it is necessary to address the issue with the level of collab-
oration and specificity it warrants. 
Regardless of the specifics or the medium through which an international 
agreement is achieved, an agreement of some sort is needed. Implementing 
United States law alone will create an exclusively reactionary model of legisla-
tion. Current legislation produced by the United States either punishes research-
ers for certain activities, limits visas for students from other countries seeking to 
gain an education and produce research in the United States or pursues a variety 
of other measures that seek to punish instead of preemptively protect. Further, 
by relying on U.S. data and sentiment alone, the United States places itself in a 
position where the country must play catch-up in discovering new methods, both 





The United States will face tough policy choices as more professors, research-
ers, students, and individuals like Li Xiao-Jiang are brought under increased 
scrutiny for espionage-related activities they may not even be participating in.200 
Academic espionage is a pervasive activity, yet an activity that is hard to define, 
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monitor, and combat.201 Regardless of academic espionage’s definition, its inter-
national regulation is of utmost importance. As the trade war between China and 
the United States continues to persist, both countries are likely to engage in any 
practice that could provide a competitive edge in economics or academia.202 The 
two countries are in an all-out battle to achieve dominance, and either country 
would welcome an opportunity to garner inside information related to national 
security.203 Legislatively, members of the United States House of Representa-
tives will continue to face challenges in drafting solutions that are encompassing 
enough to thwart real threats posed by academic espionage-related activities, 
while also finding a solution that does not limit the free and open environments 
that the United States prides itself in creating throughout the nation’s cam-
puses.204 
In many ways, the United States alone cannot tackle the complex challenges 
posed by academic espionage. Regardless of the approach various pieces of leg-
islation may take, purely domestic law will allow certain outcomes of the com-
plex problem to pervade throughout academia unregulated. By monitoring and 
regulating academic espionage through international regulation, the United 
States, along with countries around the globe, will know how to address the prob-
lem in a balanced, intelligent, and comprehensive manner. In doing so, the best 
way to address issues created by academic espionage is to view the issue through 
the lens of international trade. Academic institutions are living, breathing com-
munities where faculty and students conduct activities that span every topical 
area available for study. Campuses send researchers around the globe to gather 
information related to science, technology, communication, and more.205 College 
campuses provide services and produce work products for the communities in 
which they reside as well as communities around the world. Trade-based activi-
ties conducted on college campuses warrant a trade-based regulatory approach. 
A variety of international institutions and agreements stand ready to assist in 
the international regulation of academic espionage. However, international reg-
ulation of academic espionage is difficult due to the fact that the practice is reg-
ulated at the fringes of international law. Simply asking which mode of regula-
tion is best may be a tough question to answer. A better question, perhaps, is 
whether academic espionage should be regulated through international trade law 
at all. After answering that question in the affirmative, it is important to to con-
struct a regulatory framework that is flexible enough to continue to regulate the 
complex issue of academic espionage, and strict enough to provide enforceable 
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weight behind the laws seeking to thwart the dangerous outcomes the practice 
creates. 
Regulating academic espionage is no easy task, nor is defining or even detect-
ing the practice. While espionage itself has existed for centuries, espionage on 
college campus is a practice that researchers and lawmakers are only beginning 
to track.206 Agents of academic espionage seek more than mere academic infor-
mation. Because U.S. universities encompass large amounts of information re-
lated to economics, trade, and national security, they are appealing targets for 
anyone seeking to advance in the global trade competition. Public universities 
are instruments of state government themselves, and the global community could 
benefit from a collective, international approach to this emerging threat. Alt-
hough regulating threats posed by academic espionage will not be easy, resorting 
to international trade law is necessary for any country interested in maintaining 
security within higher education. 
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